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in the commodity, such dealing is a trading adventure; (2) the “ nature 
and quantity” of the commodity may be such as to make a transaction 
in it inherently commercial, and to exclude the possibility of its being 
merely the realization of a capital investment. In this case the respond­
ent's conduct in buying and selling the lead at a profit through the same 
channels and in the same manner as conventional lead dealers satisfied 
the first test, and 1,500 tons of lead, requiring more than twenty freight 
cars to transport them, satisfied the second.
To be taxable the transaction itself need not be part of a going bus­
iness or trade: isolation is not decisive. In a Scottish case Lord President 
Clyde said: “ A single plunge may be enough provided it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the Court that the plunge is made in the waters of 
trade.”0 That nothing has been done by the purchaser to make the 
article saleable before resale does not deprive its subsequent sale of a 
trading character. In C f.R. v. Fraser,1 a woodcutter bought a consign­
ment of whisky which he later sold in three lots at a pront. Me did not 
blend or advertise the whisky: it merely passed through his hands. Yet, 
the transfer was commercial and therefore taxable. Similarly lack of a 
business organization to market the article is not decisive. Again, dis­
similarity of the activity from the trader’s usual business is not crucial: 
a purchase and resale outside the taxpayer’s usual line of business may 
well be taxable.
Since in the present case, the respondent’s reasons “were business 
reasons of a trading nature,” 8 and the adventure a speculative one, lack 
of intention to malce a profit, lack of processing of tne product and the 
isolated nature of the transaction were not enough to deprive it of its 
trading character. The speculation was commercial and its profit taxable.
Howard McConnell, II Law U.N.B.
(6) The B a lfow n le  Land Trust, Ltd. v. C .I.R ., (19291 14 T.C. 684. at p. 691.
(7) [1942] 24 T .C . 498.
(8) [1956] C.T.C. 189, a t p. 215.
INSURANCE — FORFEITURE — ELECTION TO DEFEND — 
NON WAIVER AGREEMENT — JOINDER AS THIRD PARTY.
The plaintiff, an insurer, issued a policy indemnifying the defend­
ant against liability arising by law while operating a motor vehicle. The 
defendant ran down one, Kane, while driving in the State of Washing­
ton, U.S.A. The defendant informed the plaintiff of the accident includ­
ing the fact that he had been drinking before the accident. Kane com­
menced an action in Washington. The plaintiff obtained a non waiver 
agreement from the defendant and undertook the defence of the Kane 
action. Then the plaintiff commenced an action in B.C. claiming a de­
claration that the defendant by drunkenness forfeited his rights under 
the policv. H eld,  for the defendant. Federal Insurance Co. v. M atthews, 
[19*56] 3 D .L.R. (2d) 322 (B.C.).
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The relevant terms of the B.C. Insurance Act are similar to those 
of the N.B. Act. However, since the action brought by Kane was in the 
U.S.A., the insurer could not invoke the sections of the B.C. Statute 
corresponding to s. 211(9) of the N. B. Act: under this section an insurer 
denying liability to the insured has the right to applv to be added as a 
third party in the injured person’s action against the insured, and to 
contest the liability or the insured to the plaintiff.
This case was decided on the ground that to permit the insurer to 
defend the Kane action and denv liability under the policy would be to 
permit it to take a position in wnich its interest during the Kane action 
might be contrary to that of the insured. In effect, having elected to 
defend, the insurer was a fiduciary; as such its duty was to serve its prin­
cipal single-mindedly.
However, the insurer obtained a non waiver agreement from the 
insured and maintained that this preserved the right to repudiate liabil­
ity while still continuing the defence. In interpreting this agreement, the 
Court held it was essential to consider the intention of the parties, and 
the insured's intention could not have been that contended for by the 
insurer. Cline J. said:
In my view the non w aiver agreem ent was designed  to prevent the 
defen dan t (M atthew s) from  successfully  alleg in g  that the p la in tiff 
(insurer) had  waived the breach d u rin g  its investigations an d  up  to the 
tim e when it reached its decisions to repu d iate . T o  suggest that its 
operation  continued  after  repu d iation  w ould place a construction  upon 
the agreem ent which w ould be m anifestly  u n fa ir  to the d efen d an t.l
In defending the Kane action, it would be the duty of the insurer 
in the insured’s interest to proceed in good faith and argue that the in­
sured was not intoxicated; while at the same time, it would be in the in­
surer’s own interest in regard to the insured’s potential claim against it 
under the policy to show he was drunk. This appeared to be the point 
on which the case turned. But one might argue that the insurer could 
have denied liabilitv and defended the Kane action without any real 
clash of interests, The actions would be completely separate. The insur­
er could maintain the insured was sober, and tnat the cause of the 
accident was Kane’s negligence. If Kane recovered judgment, this in it­
self would be some indication of forfeiture by the insured. Even if the 
insured was liable on negligence alone, the insurer would then be in no 
worse position to deny liability than when first informed of the accident.
If the Kane action had been brought in B.C., the insurer would not 
have faced the problem of election. By virtue of s. 183 of the B.C. Insur­
ance Act, the insurer could have denied liability, and applied to be join­
ed as a third party to contest the action. In N.B. today, where an action 
is brought against an insured for damages arising from operation of an 
automobile, the insurer, unless it denies liability, must defend the 
action.2 If liability is denied, the insurer may be joined as a third party
«1 • [19561 3 D .L .R  «2d) 322, at p. 343.
(2) R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 113. s. 2"4.
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and contest the liability of the insured to the same extent as if a defend­
ant in the action.3 But if no ground for denying liability is disclosed until 
after an appearance has been entered, or during the trial, how must the 
insurer proceed: deny liability immediately or, under the circumstances, 
continue the defense without prejudicing the right to deny liability?
In England, v. Dominion of C an ada Gen. Ins. C o .,4 insurers, with 
knowledge of circumstances relieving them from liability, undertook and 
continued the defence of an action against the insured. In a subsequent 
action against them, they were held to have admitted liability under the 
policy and could not, therefore, repudiate liability. If the insurers intend­
ed to rely on such circumstances to relieve them from liability, it was 
their duty to abandon the defense as soon as these circumstances came 
to their knowledge. However, inStenhouse v. General Casualty Ins. C o .,h 
after the insurer’s counsel had addressed the jury, he learned for the first 
time that the insured had given a chattel mortgage of the insured car 
which, if given before the accident and during the currency of the policv, 
would have avoided the policy. Pending ascertainment of the date of the 
mortgage, counsel agreed to continue tne defense. It was held that, in the 
dilemma in which counsel found himself, it was competent for him to 
make an arrangement whereby the trial could proceed to its conclusion 
preserving the rights of the insured and the insurer pending the insurer’s 
decision. On learning the date of the mortgage and that it constituted 
a breach, the insurer did nothing further. It was held also that England  
v. Dom. of Can. Ins. Co.,  was not authority for the proposition 
that to preserve its rights an insurer must completely withdraw from the 
trial as soon as it suspects a breach bv the insured of a policy condition. 
In M arshall v. Adam son ,8 it was held that an insurer, in continuing def­
ence after grounds for repudiation have arisen during the course of an 
action but pending investigation into the grounds for repudiation, does 
not waive tne right to repudiate.
It seems, therefore, that until an insurer’s suspicion of grounds for 
repudiation becomes knowledge, the insurer may continue the defense 
without prejudicing its right to repudiate.
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